The study of dis/misinformation is currently in vogue, however with much ambiguity about what the problem precisely is, and much confusion about the key concepts that are brought to bear on this problem. My aim of this paper is twofold. First, I will attempt to precisify the (dis/mis)information problem, roughly construing it as anything that undermines the “epistemic aim of information.” Second, I will use this precisification to provide a new grounded account of dis/misinformation. To achieve the latter, I will (...) critically engage with three of the more popular accounts of dis/misinformation which are (a) harm-based, (b) misleading-based, and (c) ignorance-based accounts. Each engagement will lead to further refinement of these key concepts, ultimately paving the way for my own account. Finally, I offer my own information hazard-based account, which distinguishes between misinformation as content, misinformation as activity, and disinformation as activity. By introducing this distinction between content and activity, it will be shown that my account is erected on firmer conceptual/ontological grounds, overcoming many of the difficulties that have plagued previous accounts, especially the problem of the proper place of intentionality in understanding dis/misinformation. This promises to add clarity to dis/misinformation research and to prove more useful in practice. (shrink)

Scientific realism was famously proclaimed dead back in the early 1980s (Fine 1984). Michela Massimi’s exciting new book says otherwise. For Massimi, realism is alive and well, only we need to reconsider what we take to be the defining question of scientific realism, which, to her, is best construed not along ontological lines, i.e., whether entity X exists, but along epistemological lines, i.e., how we come to reliably know nature. Put more explicitly, for Massimi, to be a realist is to (...) be able to explain “how historically and culturally situated epistemic communities have over time come to reliably advance claims of scientific knowledge” (4). -/- The role of reliability in science has been long recognized, for example, by Kitcher (1993), Oreskes (2019), and most recently Cartwright et al. (2022). What is new about Massimi’s proposal is her emphasis on the role played by scientific perspectives in assessing reliability. Particularly, her social and cooperative construal of science makes assessing the reliability of knowledge claims not the prerogative of a single epistemic community but the collective task of multiple epistemic communities, across a plurality of scientific perspectives (5). Hence, hers is a form of ‘perspectival realism.’ -/- . (shrink)